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I. INTRODUCTION

Many have appropriately criticized international law as being vague
and ambiguous.' Though arguably applicable to other areas of law,
international law is particularly subject to interpretive criticism because
* Science Advisor/Law Clerk, Intellectual Property Practice Area, Goodwin Procter LLP. JD, 2009,
American University, Washington College of Law. MS in Electrical and Computer Engineering,
2009, Johns Hopkins University, Whiting School of Engineering. BS in Mathematics, BS in
Computer Science, Xavier University, 2006. The views expressed in this article are solely those of
the author and are not to be attributable to Goodwin Procter or its clients. © 2010 Jacob R. Osbom.
1. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
ConstitutionalLaw, Public Law, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1791, 1822 n. 101 (2009).
International law is a body of vague rules for the attention of the political scientists
and the amusement of the law student not much interested in law. It should not be
confused with real law, which, as Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out, is "the articulate
voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified."
Id. (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

1

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 4

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[4:261i

of the broad terms in which international legal provisions are generally
defined.2 When a substantive issue is interpreted under international
law, one is frequently left with the notion that the judicial interpreters
developed the legal dicta in support of the arrived-at legal determination
based on the desire to effectuate a particular outcome.3 Often, this
situation may arise in the context of an international judicial body
considering whether a national legal provision is in conformity with an
international agreement.
In general terms, it is not always the best legal argument that wins
international disputes.
In certain international disputes, beyond
proffering seemingly flawless legal arguments favoring the
interpretation of the international law in a party's favor, an advocate may
be wise to offer policy arguments as to why the legal interpreters should
favor a specific interpretation. In addition, if the legal interpreters have
preconceived notions regarding the most desirable policy to advance,
alternative means should be considered to effectuate the desired
outcome.
Accordingly, a legal advocate should consider various methods of
using the legal system to his advantage. For instance, one might
consider advancing a "historical analysis" approach to interpreting the
terms within an international agreement. In this way, rather than
accepting the textual basis for international laws as standing on its own
merits, one could more properly view the law in context of the intentions
and historical significance surrounding its formulation.
In this paper, Section I introduces the international dimension of
intellectual property with respect to the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement and the Dispute Settlement
Understanding for resolving conflicts thereupon. Section II proceeds to
examine two facets of the Canadian Patent Act: the Regulatory Review

2. See Carlos Manual Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695, 713-15 (1995) (discussing the dilemma facing courts and individuals seeking
enforcement when a treaty's provisions are too vague to determine what conduct constitutes
violation).
3.

See FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! 50 (1939).

But a non-lawyer, untrained in legal logic and trying to find a definition of Consideration
that made sense to him, might well put the whole business completely in reverse. He
might say that, so far as he can see, Consideration is what there is when a court upholds
a promise and what there isn't when a court refuses to uphold a promise. In other words,
the whole question of whether a court is going to say there is Consideration or not comes
down to a question of whether the court is going to uphold the promise or not. And
though, to a lawyer, such a notion would amount to blasphemy, there is no doubt at all
that from a practical standpoint the apparently naive non-lawyer is exactly right.
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Exception and the Stockpiling Exception. While the international
judicial authority determined that the Regulatory Review Exception was
in conformity with TRIPS, the authority also found the Stock Piling
Exception in violation of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.4 Finally,
Section III offers an alternative, historical approach to construing
TRIPS, based on the substantive rights granted in United States patent
law, and consistent with the interpretation of "limited exceptions"
embodied by the Stock Piling Exception of the Canadian Patent Act.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Intellectual property is commonly understood to be a distinct type
of legal monopoly over a creation of the mind, both artistic and
commercial, and the corresponding fields of law.5 Under intellectual
property law, owners are granted certain exclusive rights to a variety of
intangible assets, such as musical, literary, and artistic works,
discoveries and inventions, and words, phrases, symbols and designs, in
order to create incentives for development.6 Although common types of
intellectual property include copyrights, trademarks, patents, industrial
design rights, and trade secrets,7 the primary focus of this article will be
with respect to substantive patent requirements under the international
framework known as the TRIPS Agreement.
Traditionally, intellectual property has been a function of national
law.8 In other words, the protection of intellectual property rights has
traditionally been entirely within the realm of national law. Although
this continues to be the case, the TRIPS Agreement provides rules
requiring national governments to ensure a certain minimum level of
protection for patents, copyrights, industrial designs, trademarks,
business secrets, and similar matters. 9

4. Panel Report, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 7.7, 7.38,
WT/DS I 14/AB/R, (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter EuropeanCmtys. v. Canada].
5. See generally, 2 JAY DRATLER & STEPHEN MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY Chs. 5-7 (Law Journal Press 1991);
TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ACROSS

BORDERS, Ch. 1 (Thomson Reuters/West 2008).
6. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

ORGANIZATION,
INTRODUCTION
TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, Ch. I (Kluwer Law International Ltd. 1997).
7. See ARTHUR MILLER & MICHAEL DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL, Ch. 1 (West Group, 2000).
8. See, e.g., DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, Appendix 5, Regulations under the

PCT (2009).
9.

Sue Ann Mota, TRIPS- Five Years of Disputes at the WTO, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

533, 533-35 (2000).
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TRIPS Framework

The Uruguay Round Agreement on TRIPS conducted within the
framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
came into effect in 1995.10 This multilateral agreement established by
the World Trade Organization (WTO) created substantive and
procedural obligations meant to be binding on all WTO signatories."
The WTO is currently comprised of 153 member states, each member as
diverse as the body of law that they are governed by.12
On its face, the TRIPS Agreement recognizes the need to reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade, the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and the
need to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.' 3
Dissatisfaction with international intellectual property agreements and
the variance of rights afforded to inventors prompted developed
countries to pressure developing countries for the inclusion of
intellectual property rights during the Uruguay Round Negotiations. 14
With respect to patents, the TRIPS Agreement defines the subject
matter covered, establishes the rights conferred, and creates the
minimum duration of protection. 15 Although member countries may
provide more extensive coverage than is required by the TRIPS
to be the minimum standards
Agreement, TRIPS is properly understood
16
to which each member must adhere.
B.

The Dispute Settlement Understanding

An international agreement such as TRIPS is largely ineffective
without an appropriate mechanism for enforcement. 7 Accordingly, the

10. American Society of International Law, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
11. Id. at 22.
12. See Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
13. See WTO Agreement Annex IC, preamble.
14. Jose Felgueroso, TRIPS and the Dispute Settlement Understanding: The First Six Years,
30 AIPLA Q.J. 165, 171 (2002).
15. Mota, supra note 9, at 534-35.
16. Id. at 535.
17. Some suggest that the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized
agency of the United Nations that administers the Paris and Berne Conventions among other
intellectual property conventions, would be better suited to enforce intellectual property
mechanisms. However, because the enforcement body for WIPO is the International Court of

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol4/iss2/4

4

Osborn: A View of the Hierarchy of Patent Rights

A VIEW OF THE HIERARCHY OF PATENT RIGHTS

2010]

WTO established a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) as a mechanism for enforcement of the
provisions of TRIPS.' 8 Under the DSU, any of the 153 member states of
the WTO may request a consultation with the DSB when a violation of
the TRIPS Agreement is perceived.' 9 If the dispute is not resolved, the
member state alleging a violation may request that a panel be established
to hear and determine the dispute.20 Furthermore, the WTO may impose
trade sanctions against other member states that refuse to comply with
adverse decisions rendered by the panel established under the DSU.2 '
The panel established by the DSU is similar to a trial court in that
each party presents a case, and then a determination is made by the panel
with respect to the alleged violation of TRIPS. As of March 2008,
twenty-three requests for consultations under claimed TRIPS violations
had been made through the dispute settlement process.2 2 Although most
of the twenty-three disputes were resolved under mutually agreed
settlements, a handful proceeded23 to the panel stage where they were
determined by an appellate body.
III. THE CANADIAN PATENT ACT UNDER FIRE
In April 2000, the WTO panel considered whether two provisions
of Canada's Patent Act conformed to the TRIPS Agreement. 4 While
the Appellate Body found that Canada's Regulatory Review Exception
was in accordance with TRIPS, the Appellate Body also found that
Canada's Stockpiling Exception violated Article 30.25
In relevant part, the panel considered whether two provisions of the
Canadian Patent Act were in accord with TRIPS Articles 27.1, 28.1, 30,
and 33. Article 27.1 simply requires that the grant of a patent should not
be discriminated against based on the field of technology. 26 In addition,
Justice (ICJ), not a single case related to intellectual property has been brought before the ICJ. See
Felgueroso, supra note 14, at 170.
18. See Evelyn Su, The Winners and The Losers: The Agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of intellectual PropertyRights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 HouS. J. INT'L
L. 169, 189-90 (2000).
19. See WTO Agreement Annex 2, art. 4, para. 4.
20. See Mota, supra note 9, at 533.
21. See Su, supranote 18, at 189-90.
22.

JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1007 (Thomson West 2008).
23. "The Dispute Settlement Body had adopted reports in five disputes involving TRIPS at
the time of this writing." Mota, supra note 9 at 539. See also, Jackson, supra note 22, at 1007.
24. European Cmtys. v. Canada, supra note 4, at 8.1.
25. Id. at 7.36.
26. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art 27.1.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

5

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 4

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[4:261

Article 33 requires that the term of patent protection shall be no fewer
than twenty years from the filing date of the patent application.27
Article 28.1 provides the core rights that a patent shall confer:
A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a)
where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third
parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that
product.28
While Article 28.1 provides the core rights that a patent shall
confer, Article 30 provides an exception to the exclusive rights of Article
28.1. According to Article 30:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the2 patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 9
Thus, in order for a member state to provide an exception to the
exclusive rights of making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing
for these purposes, a three-part test is to be applied. The three prongs of
the test are that: (1) the exception must be limited; (2) the exception
must not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the
patent; and (3) the exception must not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the
legitimate interests of third parties.
A.

The Regulatory Review Exception

The panel considered whether two distinct provisions of the
Canadian Patent Act were in compliance with TRIPS.3 ° The first

Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to
paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article,
patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced.
Id.
27. Id. at Art. 33 ("The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a
period of twenty years counted from the filing date.").
28. Id. at Art.28.1.
29. Id. at Art. 30.
30. See European Cmtys. v. Canada,supra note 4, at 8.1.
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provision, known as the Regulatory Review Exception, provided that it
would not be infringement for a person to construct, use, or sell the
patented invention for uses related to the development and submission of
information required by the law.3 1 In practice, the Regulatory Review
Exception allowed third parties such as generic drug companies to make,
use, or sell the patented product during the term of the patent without the
consent of the patent owner. As recognized by the panel, this type of
exception is an important advantage to generic drug manufacturers,
because usually, a generic manufacturer is required to spend from two to
four years in the development of its regulatory submission.32 If the
generic drug company was unable to gather this information during the
applicable period of the patent, because the generic drug company would
be unable to compete with the original patent holder until the regulator
review process concluded, it would effectively extend the market
exclusivity of the original patent holder by a period of two to five years.
The text of §55.2(1) of the Canadian Patent Act stated,
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct,
use or sell the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information required under a law
of Canada, a province or a country other than Canada 33that regulates the
manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product.
In the United States, the Regulatory Review Exception is
commonly known as a Bolar Exception, named after the U.S. case
34 In 1984, the United States
Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that Bolar was
prohibited from using a chemical patented by Roche in experiments to
determine its bioequivalence to Valium, in order to obtain FDC approval
for its generic version of Valium.35 The U.S. court rejected the argument
that the use by Bolar constituted an "experimental use," because Bolar
ultimately intended to sell its generic product after patent expiration, and
therefore had a business as opposed to an experimental purpose.36 In
31. Id. at 2.1.
32. Id. at 2.5.
33. Canada Patent Act, R.S.C., § 55.2(1) (1985) (repealed). For the text of § 55.2, see supra
note 4, at 7.7.
34. LiLan Ren, A Comparison of 28 U.S. C. § 1498(A) andForeignStatues and an Analysis of
§ 1498(A)'s Compliance with TRIPS, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1659, 1679 (2005); see also Roche Prods.
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
35. See Roche Prods., 733 F.2d 858.
36. Id. at 863. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit additionally noted that apparent
policy conflicts between statutes such as the Food and Drug Act and the Patent Act should be
decided by Congress and not the courts. Id. at 863-64.
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response, Congress passed a law permitting use of the patented products
in experiments for the purposes of obtaining FDA approval. 7
Thus, at the time of the panel report, the United States also had a
statutory regulatory review exception. In addition, after the conclusion
of the TRIPS Agreement, four other WTO Members-Argentina,
Australia, Hungary and Israel-also
adopted legislation containing
3
regulatory review exceptions. 8
A layperson may suppose that the panel would consider that
various signatories of the WTO recognized the Bolar Exception in
compliance with TRIPS, and therefore arrive at the simple legal
conclusion that the Bolar Exception was in compliance with the broad
"limited exceptions" provision of TRIPS. 39 Rather, the panel issued a
200-page report 4° finding that the Canadian Regulatory Review
Exception was in fact a limited exception, did not conflict with a normal
exploitation of patents, and did not prejudice the legitimate interest of
affected patent owners within the meaning of Article 30.41 With respect
to interpreting "limited exception," the panel noted, "As long as the
exception is confined to conduct needed to comply with the
requirements of the regulatory approval process, the extent of the acts
unauthorized by the right holder that are permitted by it will be small
and narrowly bounded. ' 42 Thus, Canada's Regulator Review Exception
was found to be consistent with the provisions of TRIPS.

37. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 271(e)(1)
(1984).
38. Jackson, supra note 22, at 1014. Furthermore, both Japan and Portugal adopted
interpretations of existing patent law which confirmed exemptions for regulatory review
submissions, either in the interpretation of "experimental use" or in similar patent exceptions. Id.at
1014-15.
39. See FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! 7 (1939).
Briefly, the Law is carried on in a foreign language. Not that it deals, as do medicine
and mechanical engineering, with physical phenomena and instruments which need
special words to describe them simply because there are no other words. On the
contrary, law deals almost exclusively with the ordinary facts and occurrences of
everyday business and government and living. But it deals with them in a jargon
which completely baffles and befoozles the ordinary literate man, who has no legal
training to serve him as a trot.
Id.
40. The Report contains over 115,000 words. See European Cmtys. v. Canada,supranote 4.
41. See EuropeanCmtys. v. Canada,supra note 4, at 158.
42. Id. at 7.45. The Panel also noted that:
Even though regulatory approval processes may require substantial amounts of test
production to demonstrate reliable manufacturing, the patent owner's rights
themselves are not impaired any further by the size of such production runs, as long as
they are solely for regulatory purposes and no commercial use is made of resulting
final products.
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B.

RIGHTS

The Stockpiling Exception

The second provision considered by the panel, known as the
Stockpiling Exception, provided that it would not be infringement for a
person to make, construct, or use the invention during the applicable
period, for the manufacture and storage of articles intended for sale after
the date on which the term of the patent expires. The text of §55.2(2)
stated:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person who makes,
constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with
subsection (1) to make, construct or use the invention, during the
applicable period provided for by the regulations, for the manufacture
for sale after the date on which the
and storage of articles intended
43
expires.
patent
the
of
term
In effect, this statute provided for any generic drug company in
Canada to perform the acts of making, constructing, and using the
patented invention during the last six months of the patent term without
authorization of the patent holder. 44 In contrast to the Regulatory
Review Exception, Canada was the only country in the world to allow
for such a Stockpiling Exception.4 5
Notably, the Stockpiling Exception was part of the Canadian Patent
Act Amendment Act, which entered into force in February 1993, more
than a full year before the 1994 TRIPS Agreement.4 6 However, contrary
to the Regulatory Review Exception, the Stockpiling Exception of
Canada's Patent Act was found to violate Canada's obligations under
47
TRIPS because it was not a "limited exception" under Article 30.
According to the panel, with no limitations upon the quantity of
production, the Stockpiling Exception removed the patent protection
entirely during the last six months of the patent term, including
additional commercial and market benefits via a short period of extended
market exclusivity after the patent expires. 48 The panel determined that
"limited exception" referred to "the exclusive rights," and therefore must

Id.
43.
note 4, at
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Canada Patent Act, R.S.C., § 55.2(2) (1985) (repealed). For the text of § 55.2, see supra
7.7.
See European Cmtys. v. Canada, supra note 4, at 4.2.
Id. at 74.2.
Id. at 74.6.
Id. at IN 7.33 - 7.36.
Id. at IM7.34 - 7.35.
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be read to connote a narrow exception, one which makes only a small
diminution of the rights in question.4 9
Having determined that Canada's Stockpiling Exception was not a
"limited exception," the panel found it unnecessary to consider whether
the Stockpiling Exception was in accord with the second and third
prongs of the test.5 °
C. Interpretationof Limited Exceptions
The panel decision was inconsistent on various levels, and as a
result, has been widely criticized.51 In plain terms, the panel determined
that the Stockpiling Exception was not limited because the patent rights
of Article 28.1 include indirect rights occurring after the term of the
patent, such as the market benefits during the short period of extended
market exclusivity after the patent expires. However, although the same
thing could be said for the Regulatory Review Exception, the panel
made no mention of this fact.
In addition, while the panel considered all three prongs of the test in
parallel when deciding the fate of the Regulatory Review Exception, the
panel only considered the first part of the test with respect to the
Stockpiling Exception. This piecemeal interpretation effectively limited
the decision to "limited exceptions," rather than appropriately
considering the impact of the statute on the normal exploitation of the
patent and the possible prejudice of the legitimate interests of the patent
owner. It is difficult to imagine how these two prongs would have
varied from the analysis applied to the Regulatory Review Exception,
except that the analysis may have varied in favor of Canada.
Ironically, it may be that Canada did not appeal the panel decision
to the Appellate Body because the Stockpiling Exception was much
more limited than the Regulatory Review Exception. It is likely that the
Regulatory Review Exception is actually more beneficial to the generic
drug companies than the Stockpiling Exception. For instance, it may
take a generic company many years to comply with the regulatory
review established by the government if the statutory exception would
have been found to be invalid. These many years could have adverse
49. Id. at 7.30.
50. Id. at 7.38. The second and third prongs of the test are: (2) the exception must not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent, and (3) the exception must not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the
legitimate interests of third parties. Id. at 7.51, 7.60.
51. See, e.g., Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel - A Dangerous
Precedentin Dangerous Times, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP., 4,493-507 (2000).
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affects on getting the generic drug to the market quickly, thereby de
facto prolonging the length of the patent holder's rights.
If the Stockpiling Exception would have been determined to be in
compliance with TRIPS and the Regulatory Review Exception
conflicting with TRIPS, the result is that the Stockpiling Exception
would not have been as beneficial to the generic drug companies as the
Regulatory Review Exception. Although the generic drugs would have
been able to more quickly enter the market with stockpiled supplies, in
most instances it would not take a generic drug company as long to
manufacture the drug as it would to complete the regulatory review
process required by the government.
It is likely that the panel arrived at the above interpretation of
TRIPS simply because Canada was the only member state with a prior
Stockpiling Exception. Justifying the panel decision on the grounds that
Canada was the only member state with a prior Stockpiling Exception
may have made more sense than interpreting the word "limited" in the
context of exclusive market rights. In short, one is left wondering how
the panel determined the broader of the two limitations to be the sole
limited exception.
IV. THE HIERARCHY OF PATENT RIGHTS
The rights included in TRIPS Article 28.1 are to prevent third
parties from: (1) making; (2) using; (3) offering for sale; (4) selling; or
(5) importing for these purposes, the patented invention. 52 These five,
distinctive rights are inherently hierarchical. A historical analysis of
these distinctive rights suggests that they have not always been treated
the same under legal jurisdictions. In addition, the modem-day
application of widely accepted curtailments to these rights further
suggests that they are not all to be treated equally in every respect.
In promoting the arts and sciences, it is generally understood that
for the public utility obtained by disclosure of the invention, the patentee
is granted a limited monopoly in order to profit from the invention. 53 In
exchange for his invention and the knowledge imparted by his disclosure
of the invention, the reward bestowed on the inventor can be readily
summarized as the ability to exclusively profit from his invention.
Essentially, a system that affords the exclusive right to profit in
exchange for disclosure of invention partially dispenses to the free
market the ultimate value of the compensation for actualizing an
52.

TRIPS Agreement, supranote 10, Art. 28.1.

53. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 6, at Ch. 1.
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invention. By way of example, the monetary amount that the public is
willing to pay for the invention, absent the traditional free-market
decrease in price due to competition, is the price that the inventor may
charge for his patented invention.
Assuming, arguendo, that the right to profit from the invention is a
primary benefit conferred to inventors in our current patent system, then
one must consider why rights, other than the right to exclude others from
selling the invention, are included in the modem formulation of patent
laws. In conceptual terms, it is apparent that the right to sell the
invention is most directly linked to the value of compensation for
actualizing the invention. However, the rights to make, use, offer for
sale, or import the invention may or may not be directly related to the
ability of the patentee to exclusively profit from his invention.
In summary, "secondary" rights (i.e. rights tangential, but possibly
related to the right to profit) are likely included in modem patent laws in
order to ensure the right of the inventor to profit from his invention
remains fully undiminished. As an illustrative example, if someone
were to offer to sell an invention patented by another, this offer for sale
may or may not have an effect on the bottom-line price, which the
patentee may obtain for his invention. First, the offer for sale may be at
a much higher price than the price at which the patentee sells his
patented invention, thus eliciting a rejection of the offer and consumer
understanding that the patentee indeed offers the invention at the best
price. In theoretical free-market analysis, there is unlikely to be an
economic difference to the bottom-line economic benefit of the patentee
between the situations where: (1) the consumer understands that a
patentee is the exclusive provider of the good; and (2) the consumer
understands that a patentee is the lowest price provider of the good. 4
However, if the offer for sale is at a price much lower than the price at
which the patentee sells his invention, the consumer may choose to
forego purchase of the good from the patentee, because the patentee does
not offer the good at the lowest price. Therefore, in some instances, it is
possible that an "offer for sale" has a direct effect on lowering the
exclusive right to profit of the patentee.55

54. By way of example, this hypothetical assumes a theoretically efficient market based on
full consumer knowledge of the prices of goods.
55. It is also possible that a consumer could purchase the first good he finds on the market,
regardless of price. This could also have an effect on the right of the inventor to exclusively profit.
Also, note that an "offer for sale" during the end years of a patent term could delay a consumer's
purchase, to cause him to wait until the non-patent holder may enter the market.
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Assuming that the goal of the patent system is to reward the
patentee by providing him the right to exclusively profit from his
patented invention during the length of the patent term in exchange for
the disclosure and eventual public utility of the invention, one would
expect to find curtailments to the "secondary" rights bestowed to the
patent holder in cases where his profit is unaffected. As expected, in
situations where the right of the inventor to monopolistically profit from
his invention remains unimpaired, historical analysis reveals that
governing bodies are most comfortable with legislating curtailments to
secondary rights.
In United States law, the same rights as those enumerated in Article
28.1 are currently codified in 35 U.S.C. § 154.56
Some have
appropriately criticized the textual basis of TRIPS as derived from the
laws of developed countries.
In fact, analysis of the language of
TRIPS suggests that much of the text was copied from U.S. law at the
time of the drafting of TRIPS. Therefore, if much of the basis of the
textual significance was extrapolated from U.S. law, it may then be
appropriate to consider whether the United States considers a hierarchy
of significance to these rights.
A.

1770- 1836

U.S. law did not always provide for each of these five distinctive
rights. In the United States, the first Patent Act of 1790 contained only
three of these rights-the rights to make, use, and vend-for the limited
duration of fourteen years.58 As a remedy, the 1790 Patent Act provided
for jury-assessed damages and forfeiture of the infringing items to the
patent holder.5 9 Shortly thereafter, in 1793, the Patent Act was revised.
56. "Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States ....
" 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002).
57. See generally, CARLOS M. CORREA & ABDULQAWI A. YUSUF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, 8 (2d ed. 2008). See also, H.R. REP. NO.

100-576, tit. I, subtit. A, pt. l(b)(10) (1988) (showing where the United States sought, as negotiating
objectives, enactment and enforcement of regulations to protect intellectual property in accord with
its views).
58. ". . . and thereupon granting to such petitioner or petitioners, his, her or their heirs,
administrators or assigns for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right and
liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention or
discovery ...." Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 154 (2002)).

59. Patent Act of 1790, supra note 58 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003), 284
(1999)).
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While the 1793 revision did not affect the exclusive rights granted to the
inventor, it provided protection exclusively for U.S. citizens, modified
the types of infringement that warranted a remedy, and revised the
compensation to be granted in the event of infringement. A remedy was
warranted in three distinct cases. 60 The first case was when any person
makes the thing invented; the second case was when any person devises
and uses the thing invented; and the third case was when any person
sells the thing invented. 6' Remarkably, simply using the invention did
not rise to the level of infringement. In addition, offering to sell the
invention did not rise to the level of infringement.
The exclusive remedy provided to the patent holder was that the
infringer should pay a sum at least three times the price of which the
patentee has usually sold or licensed the patented item.
Thus, the
modem notion of an injunction was deleted from the final wording of the
Patent Act of 1793.
As can be seen, from an early point in patent law history, it is clear
that a great emphasis was placed on the monetary reward that the
patentee was granted in exchange for his disclosure of the invention.
This historical emphasis is consistent with the modem incentive-based
justification for our patent system. In fact, an infringer could simply

And be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall devise, make, construct,
use, employ, or vend within these United States, any art, manufacture, engine, machine
or device, or any invention or improvement upon, or in any art, manufacture, engine,
machine or device, the sole and exclusive right of which shall be so as aforesaid granted
by patent to any person or persons, by virtue and in pursuance of this act, without the
consent of the patentee or patentees, their executors, administrators, or assigns, first had
and obtained in writing, every person so offending, shall forfeit and pay to the said
patentee or patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators or assigns such damages
as shall be assessed by a jury, and moreover shall forfeit to the person aggrieved, the
thing or things so devised, made, constructed, used, employed or vended, contrary to the
true intent of this act, which may be recovered in an action on the case founded on this
act.
Id.
60. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, § 5 (1793) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1999)).
And be it further enacted, That if any person shall make, devise and use, or sell the thing
so invented, the exclusive right of which shall, as aforesaid, have been secured to any
person by patent, without the consent of the patentee, his executors, administrators or
assigns, first obtained in writing, every person so offending, shall forfeit and pay to the
patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the
patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention;
which may be recovered in an action on the case founded on this act, in the circuit court
of the United States, or any other court having competent jurisdiction.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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elect to infringe the patent and sell the patented invention if he were
willing to compensate the patent holder at a rate of three times the price
at which the patent holder sells the invention. Moreover, importation or
an offer to sell the invention did not even rise to the level of
infringement. The 1793 Patent Law included that a third party would
infringe the patent by devising and using the patented invention, not by
merely using the invention. Taken in context, this language was likely
incorporated to prohibit the infringer from circumventing the intentions
of the law by selling something other than the patented invention itself
(e.g., services and use of the patented invention to the benefit of his
customers).
B. 1836- Current
The Patent Laws were again revised in 1836, but did not vary
significantly from the language used in the eighteenth century-this
included the rights to make, use, and vend.63 While the 1836 Patent
Laws included only a remedy of monetary damages, not until 1870 were
64
the Patent Laws revised to again include a remedy for an injunction.
As an equitable remedy, the injunction allowed the court to prohibit the
infringement from occurring in the future, in situations where monetary
damages were unable to solve the problem.
Then, in 1952, the text of the Patent Laws was changed from "the
full and exclusive right and liberty of making, using, and vending to
others to be used" to "the right to exclude others from making, using, or

63. Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, § 14 (1836) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1999)).
Every such patent shall... grant to the applicant or applicants ... the full and exclusive
right and liberty of making, using, and vending to others to be used, the said invention or
discovery ....And be it further enacted, That whenever, in any action for damages for
making, using, or selling the thing whereof the exclusive right is secured by any patent
heretofore granted, or by any patent which may be hereafter granted, a verdict shall be
rendered for the plaintiff in such action, it shall be in the power of the court to render
judgment for any sum above the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages
sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the
circumstances of the case, with costs; and such damages may be recovered by action on
the case, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to be brought in the name or names of
the person or persons interested; whether as patentees, assignees, or as grantees of the
exclusive right within and throughout a specified part of the United States.
Id.
64. "... and the court shall have power, upon bill in equity filed by any party aggrieved, to
grant injunctions according to the course and principles of courts of equity, to prevent the violation
of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court may deem reasonable ....
" Patent Act of
1870, Ch.230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (1870) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952)).
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selling." 65 In part, the wording of the granting clause was changed to
"selling" following language used by the Supreme Court, in order to
render the meaning clearer.66 However, as of 1952, the rights to exclude
others from "offering to sell" or "importing" the patented invention
remained excluded from U.S. Patent Laws.
Not until the Patent Amendment Act of 1996 did the U.S. Patent
Laws supplement the rights of excluding others from "offering for sale"
and "importing" the patented invention to the traditional basic rights of
making, using, and selling.67 In fact, prior to the 1996 Amendment,
actions other than unauthorized making, using, or selling did not
constitute infringement of the patent even though they may have
impaired or lessened the patent's economic value.68 The exclusive right
to offer the patented invention for sale extended the scope of the
patentee's rights to unauthorized
activities that fell short of actual
69
selling, making, or using.
It is possible that the inclusion of "offering for sale" and
"importing" in the Patent Act of 1996 was, to a large extent, due to the
effects of globalization. In the 1700s and 1800s, it would not have been
as likely that an offer for sale could have such a drastic effect on the
ability of the patentee to exclusively profit from his invention during the
patent term. Presently, a producer of goods is able to use the Internet
and modem advertising methods to immediately offer for sale to
millions of prospective consumers. Similarly, the sheer number of
goods imported into the United States far exceeds those imported earlier
in the nation's history. Thus, it is suggested that the inclusion of these
"secondary" rights ultimately evolved under the modem theory that the
patentee has the exclusive right to profit from his invention during the
applicable patent term, although this right to profit may or may not be
affected by these "secondary" rights.
C.

Modern Day Limitations

The legislative history and modem day limitations placed on patent
rights suggest that not all patent rights are to be treated equally.

65. "Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from making, using,
or selling the invention throughout the United States, referring to the specification for the particulars
thereof." Patent Act of 1952, Ch. 14, § 154 (1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2002)).
66. Chisum, supra note 8, at § 16.02.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Limitations on granting injunctions, the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, and
exceptions for scientific research further suggest that the ultimate right
to profit from the patented invention during the patent term is the
primary intent of our patent laws. An understanding that the underlying
intent of the patent laws is to protect the right of the patentee to
exclusively profit from his invention advances the notion of a
hierarchical approach to understanding the rights of the patentee.
First, the limitation on the grant of an injunction suggests that a
primary purpose in our patent system is to allow the patent holder to
exclusively profit from his invention during the patent term. The
Supreme Court recently determined in eBay v. MercExchange that a
four-factor test, historically employed by equity courts in considering
whether to award permanent injunctive relief to the prevailing plaintiff,
should also apply to disputes arising under the Patent Act.7 ° In
particular, the court determined that a prevailing plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must demonstrate that: (1) the plaintiff has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as
moneitary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
whenconsidering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 71 The requirement
that monetary damages be inadequate to compensate for the injury is
consistent with the general theme that the patent system is ultimately
designed to allow the patentee to profit from his invention, unimpeded
by competitive market forces. In other words, courts are often
complacent with infringing behavior, as long as the patentee is
economically rewarded the value of his patent.
Second, a prong of the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine places a limit on
the right to exclude others from "using" the patented invention,
consistent with the theme of allowing the patentee to profit from his
invention.72 According to the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, a person lawfully purchasing and using a
patented product during the original patent term has a right to continue
such use during any extension of the patent.7 3 The Supreme Court
noted, "in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person
having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its

70. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2005).
71. Id.
72. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 31-32 (2001).
73. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453,455 (1873).
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use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right
to restrict that use. The article . . .passes without the limit of the
monopoly ... . This limit on the right to exclude others from "using"
a patented invention is consistent with the patentee's right to profit from
his invention.
The argument for a hierarchical approach to patent rights is further
supported by the exceptions that are carved out to modem patent laws.
Throughout history, in situations where the "secondary" rights are found
to have no bearing on the right of the patent holder to profit from his
invention, exceptions have been made. The experimental use exception
to patent infringement is an example of such exceptions.75 Although this
doctrine suffered a serious setback in the case of Madey v. Duke
University,76 competing views have arisen over the significance of the
experimental use doctrine in application to particular areas of
technology.77 In general terms, the experimental use privilege allows a
researcher to use a patented invention without permission from or
compensation to the patent owner.78 However, the use must be "merely
for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the invention to produce its described effects. 79 The
curtailment on the exclusive right of the patent holder to preclude others
from "using" the patented invention for experimental use seems
consistent with the theme of the patentee to be compensated from his
invention. In this situation, the experimental use of the invention is not a
threat to the competition for sales of the patented invention by the patent
holder.

74. Id. at 456.

75. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)(2003).
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United
States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal
drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
Id.
76. The Federal Circuit held that the experimental use privilege does not apply to activities
that are "in keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate business"-even though the business of
the defendant, Duke University, was nonprofit research. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351,
1362 (2002).
77.
PATENT
78.
79.

JOHN R. THOMAS, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE EXPERIMENTAL USE PRIVILEGE IN
LAW, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, at 2 (Oct. 28, 2004).
Id. at 6.
Douglas v. United States, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170, 176 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. 1974).
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Both the historical interpretation and the modem application of
patent law suggest that the over-reaching objective of compensation of
the patent holder is the main intention and purpose of the patent laws.
Put in simplistic terms, in exchange for the right to compensation not
subject to ordinary competitive market forces, the patentee agrees to
disclose his invention to the public.
D. HierarchicalApplication to TRIPS
In interpreting TRIPS, the panel ultimately rejected the EC's
position that "limited exceptions" measures the curtailment of the patent
owner's rights by counting the number of legal rights impaired by an
exception. 80 The panel also rejected Canada's argument that the
curtailment of the patent owner's legal rights is "limited" just so long as
the exception preserves the exclusive right to sell to the ultimate
consumer during the patent term. 81 In support of the rejection, the panel
suggested that:
implicit in the Canadian argument is a notion that the right to exclude
sales to consumers during the patent term is the essential right
conveyed by the patent, and the rights to exclude "making" and
"using" the patented product during the term of the patent are in some
way secondary.

82

The panel did not find support for creating a hierarchy of patent
rights within the TRIPS Agreement because, "if the right to exclude
sales were all that really mattered, there would be no reason to add other
rights to exclude 'making' and 'using."' ' 8 3 As shown by historical
analysis and common sense application of the exceptions to patent law
provisions, the panel was correct that the right to exclude sales is not all
that really matters. Rather, the right of the patentee to exclusively profit
from the patented invention during the term of the patent is what really
matters. Under this proper analysis, the panel may have found support
for creating a hierarchy of patent rights within the TRIPS Agreement.
V. CONCLUSION

In all likelihood, the inclusion of the rights of making, using,
offering for sale, and importing are secondary to the overall right to

80.
81.

EuropeanCmtys. v. Canada, supranote 4, at
EuropeanCrmtys. v. Canada, supranote 4, at

7.32.
7.33.

82. Id.
83. Id.
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profit from the invention, and the closely related right to sell the
patented invention. In any given situation, these secondary rights may
or may not be directly linked to the right of the patent holder to be
exclusively compensated for his invention. In order to guarantee that the
patent holder is fully empowered to exclusively profit from his invention
during the length of the patent term, history suggests that it is necessary
to include these secondary rights into the set of rights given to the patent
holder, at least in some form. However, inclusion of these secondary
rights into modem patent laws should not completely remove the rights
from the context in which they are given, especially when interpreting
international law provisions. Courts, judicial interpreters, and legal
advocates would be wise to understand patent rights in the context of
history, by taking a hierarchical approach to patent rights.
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